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Abstract 
The Serdar Mohammed litigation signalled a decisive change in judicial attitude towards scrutiny of 
extraterritorial executive action in armed conflict. The most significant indicator of a change of 
judicial attitude in the Serdar Mohammed litigation was the reinstatement of the act of state doctrine 
in the private law claim in tort. Act of state bars tort claims against the Crown when the Crown 
acts outside of its territory. The UK Supreme Court characterised act of state as a non-justiciability 
doctrine. The article argues that the UK Supreme Court exercised extreme deference in its 
adjudication of the act of state in the private law claim. This deference was then mirrored in the 
reasoning employed in the public law claim under the HRA, departing from international and 
domestic standards on detention in non-international armed conflicts.  
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Introduction 
Over the last two decades UK courts embraced the extraterritorial application of the Human 
Rights Act 1998 (HRA) in armed conflict. This means that the courts increasingly held the 
executive to account when acting outside of UK territory. Further, courts increasingly found 
themselves adjudicating upon and enforcing international law norms. This is significant as the UK 
is a dualist state and the normal state of affairs is that in order for international law to be 
enforceable in UK domestic law it must be incorporated through domestic legislation.1 Although 
the HRA is domestic legislation that incorporates only the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR), in its extraterritorial application in armed conflict it is an instrument through 
which other international law obligations are enforced. In extraterritorial armed conflict cases, UK 
courts acknowledged other international law norms designed to regulate armed conflict in the 
interpretation of the HRA including the laws of armed conflict (LOAC) and United Nations 
Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs).2 Another consequence of the extraterritorial application 
of the HRA in armed conflict was that extraterritorial prerogative powers were increasingly 
challenged as it was acknowledged that parliamentary legislation superseded unilateral executive 
decision-making.3 
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On 17th January 2017, two judgments handed down by the UK Supreme Court - a private and a 
public law claim – concerning the alleged illegal detention by the UK of a suspected terrorist in 
Afghanistan, the Serdar Mohammed litigation, signalled a decisive change in judicial attitude towards 
scrutiny of extraterritorial executive action in armed conflict.4 This case was significant for the 
extraterritorial enforcement of the ECHR because it was the first time that the ECHR would apply 
to military intervention in Afghanistan.5 It would provide a blueprint for other Council of Europe 
states and the ECtHR, in deciding upon the application of the ECHR to ‘internationalised’ non-
international armed conflict (NIAC)6 and would represent a significant expansion of 
extraterritorial adjudication.  
It was perhaps as a result of the perceived political and international significance of this decision 
that the courts decided to take a remarkably more restrained approach to the public law and private 
law claims. The most significant indicator of a change of judicial attitude in the Serdar Mohammed 
litigation was the reinstatement of the act of state doctrine in the private law claim in tort: an 
elusive prerogative power, the parameters of which remain vague, and had only been successfully 
invoked in the Privy Council during the 20th century until the present litigation when it was 
successfully used as a defence to a claim in tort.7 Broadly, act of state bars tort claims against the 
crown when the crown acts outside of its territory. It presented itself, obiter dicta, in Al Jedda v 
Ministry of Defence (No 2) in 2010 but was fully utilised and reinstated in the present litigation.8 The 
act of state doctrine, although confined to the private law claim, underpins a radically more 
deferential approach by the courts to extraterritorial claims arising from armed conflict. Further, 
while act of state was reinvigorated with life in both the High Court and Court of Appeal Serdar 
Mohammed litigation, and successfully invoked in the High Court, the Supreme Court’s 
conceptualisation and characterisation of act of state signalled a deference to the executive that 
was uncharacteristic of the trend towards acceptance of scrutiny of extraterritorial executive action 
in armed conflict under the HRA. While all three courts accept that act of state can be a defence 
in tort or a principle of non-justiciability, the High Court and Court of Appeal concluded that 
arbitrary and unlawful detention was a justiciable issue, while a majority in the Supreme Court 
decided it was not. The High Court and Court of Appeal decisions treated act of state as a defence 
in tort, whereas the majority of justices on the Supreme Court treated it as a non-justiciable issue.  
The article argues that the majority of the Supreme Court characterised act of state as a principle 
of non-justiciability. It then posits four criticisms against the characterisation of act of state as a 
non-justiciability rule. First, act of state as a non-justiciability doctrine is an anachronistic principle 
that originated in colonialist practices of despotic rule and has no place in contemporary 
governance. Second, act of state as a principle of non-justiciability falls far below the standard of 
‘high policy’ decisions accepted as non-justiciable in contemporary discourse. The day-to-day 
administration of detention policies falls outside normal ambit of ‘high policy’. Third, the judges 
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6 For one of the most comprehensive accounts of the internationalisation of a NIAC and the ensuing legal 
challenges see Kubo Macak, Internationalized Armed Conflicts in International Law (OUP 2018). 
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Ministry of Defence [2014] EWHC 3846 (QB) soon followed the Mohammed High Court decision and was considered 
jointly with Mohammed in the Supreme Court private law claim (Mohammed I).  




only review public law non-justiciability cases despite the fact that this is a private law claim in tort 
and there is a distinct body of case law on non-justiciability in this area of law which points to 
detention being justiciable. Fourth, there is a disparity of treatment by the courts of the prerogative. 
The courts are much more willing to review prerogatives concerning domestic affairs - even if they 
are prima facie matters falling within ‘high policy’ subject matter - than they are willing to review 
prerogatives which effect extraterritorial individuals - even if the latter concerns a traditionally 
justiciable subject matter. The article then argues that the extreme deference exercised in the act 
of state private law decision was reflected in the judge’s adjudication of the human rights issue in 
the public law judgment, representing a change in judicial attitude toward a more deferential 
approach to the executive, and less willingness to engage in extraterritorial scrutiny. An analysis of 
the competing international and domestic law norms is conducted to argue that the judges departed 
from accepted and agreed upon standards of international and domestic law with the instrumental 
purpose of ensuring some consistency between the private and public law adjudication.  
The principle developed in the public law decision has implications for the enforcement of 
international law in UK domestic law. The HRA has become a gateway through which 
international obligations beyond the ECHR are enforceable. The High Court and Court of Appeal 
Serdar Mohammed judgments are illustrative of the employment of international law in the 
interpretation of human rights in armed conflict. The act of state doctrine in the private law 
judgment, as part of its deference towards the executive inculcates the prioritisation of domestic 
constitutional law principles over more outward looking, international perspective. Act of state 
thus sets the tone of a domestic-oriented approach to extraterritorial cases, which is carried 
through to the public law judgment by deprioritising an analysis of international law regulating the 
situation. 
The Supreme Court Decision on Crown Act of State 
Serdar Mohammed was detained for 110 days without charge and access to a court to determine 
legality of detention from April-July 2010 in Afghanistan by UK forces. The applicant alleged that 
his detention did not conform with law and policy under the  International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF) Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) 362 which permitted detention for up to 96 
hours before the detainee had to be transferred to Afghan authorities with limited exceptions to 
this rule (including if a delay arose because of an inability to transfer the prisoner). Further it was 
alleged that this was not in conformity with Afghan domestic law which permitted detention for 
up to 72 hours, article 5 ECHR which prohibits internment in NIACs absent a derogation, and 
customary international law on detention in NIACs. 
Initially, the Ministry of Defence argued that act of state was a bar to a private and public law 
claim.9 Justice Leggatt in the High Court found that the doctrine of Crown act of state does not 
operate in the field of public law but only operates in the field of tort law.10 This was accepted by 
the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court.11 Both the High Court and Court of Appeal 
characterised act of state as a defence in tort and not a rule of non-justiciability because it was 
justiciable under the HRA. However, the High Court ruled that the act of state could be a defence 
in the present litigation whereas the Court of Appeal was not convinced that it was in the public 
interest to allow the act of state to operate as a bar on the claim in the present litigation.  
When the case arrived at the Supreme Court, act of state as a rule of non-justiciability or a defence 
to a claim in tort, was only considered in relation to the breach of Afghan tort law. The Supreme 
Court unanimously agreed that act of state could be successfully invoked. The judges were split 
 
9 Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2014] EWHC 1369 (QB) para 409. 
10 Ibid para 379. 





on whether act of state should be characterised as a defence in tort or a principle of non-
justiciability but regardless of characterisation ultimately agreed with the definition put forward by 
Lady Hale. Acts of state are ‘sovereign acts…the sorts of things that governments properly do; 
committed abroad; in the conduct of the foreign policy of the state; so closely connected to that 
policy to be necessary in pursuing it; and at least extending to the conduct of military operations 
which are themselves lawful in international law (which is not the same as saying that the acts 
themselves are necessarily authorised in international law)’.12  The latter phrase means that in order 
to invoke act of state as a bar to an extraterritorial tort claim, the military intervention and British 
presence in Afghanistan must be legal but the act which is under judicial scrutiny (e.g. detention 
of an individual) can be otherwise illegal under international law for the defence of act of state to 
be invoked. Act of state cannot operate as a bar to an action regarding allegations of torture, 
maltreatment of prisoners or detainees,13 but can apply in cases of expropriation and destruction 
of property,14 killings, and detention.15 Act of state could be used as a defence against both 
nationals and non-nationals extraterritorially.16  
Although the crown act of state applies solely in the private law claim and not in the public law 
claim there is a divergence of opinion across the Supreme Court as to whether there is any legal 
authority for the proposition that act of state operates as a defence in tort. Lord Mance 
characterises act of state as a rule of non-justiciability finding no authority for act of state as a 
defence in tort. He purports to agree with Lord Sumption’s definition but Lord Sumption adopts 
Lady Hale’s definition, which is framed as a defence in tort.17 Lady Hale, with whom Lords Wilson 
and Hughes agreed, accepts there are two conceptions of act of state, non-justiciability and a 
defence to a tort claim. For her, act of state as a non-justiciability rule does not extend to the 
subject matter of the current case: detention practices in the course of UK military operations. 
Instead, act of state as a defence in tort is successfully invoked. Lord Mance, with whom Lords 
Hughes agrees, finds that Crown act of state is only a non-justiciability rule (and not a defence to 
a tort claim) and that the present private law action is non-justiciable.18 Lord Sumption finds that 
act of state is a non-justiciability rule and tort defence but that the rules ‘merge into one’ principle 
of non-justiciability.19 Lord Clarke agrees with Lord Sumption.20 Lord Neuberger, with whom Lord 
Hughes agrees, declines to describe crown act of state as a principle of non-justiciability, and 
implies that there is limited authority for the proposition that it is a defence in tort. He encourages 
‘caution’ in its contemporary use, but recognises its existence and agrees with the definition put 
forward by Lady Hale.21 All judges are in favour of the contemporary relevance and application of 
act of state in the context described by Lady Hale.  
However, the divergence of opinion on what principles and precedent this is founded upon calls 
into question the legitimacy of the ruling. The most convincing arguments made on both sides are 
those made against characterising act of state as a defence in tort or a rule of non-justiciability. 
Lord Hughes ignores the disparity and agrees with every judge. Leaving him aside, two judges read 
act of state as operating as a defence in tort (Hale and Wilson), three judges ultimately characterise 
it as a principle of non-justiciability (Mance, Sumption and Clarke), and Lord Neuberger concedes 
 
12 Mohammed I (n 4) para 37 per Lady Hale. Lords Wilson and Hughes agree. Lord Sumption (para 81) and Mance 
(para 72) agree with Lady Hale but they omit the phrase about the lawfulness of the military intervention being a 
condition and an act can be designated as an act of state before or after the event has taken place. 
13 Ibid para 36 per Lady Hale. 
14 Ibid para 36 per Lady Hale; para 96 per Lord Sumption. 
15 Ibid para 32 per Lady Hale; para 88 per Lord Sumption. 
16 Ibid para 29, 37 per Lady Hale. 
17 Ibid para 36 per Lady Hale; paras 88-93 per Lord Sumption 88-93; paras 56-58 per Lord Mance. 
18 Ibid para 101 per Lord Mance.  
19 Ibid para 81 per Lord Sumption  
20 Ibid paras107-109 per Lord Clarke. 




his discomfort in characterising it as either. Moving forward, the act of state doctrine will be a 
successful defence to an extraterritorial private law claim in the circumstances outlined by Lady 
Hale and, based on a 3-2 majority, treated as a principle of non-justiciability. While the act of state 
as a defence in tort was the predominant focus of the litigation running up to the Supreme Court 
decision and has been examined in depth elsewhere,22 this article considers the negative 
implications of framing act of state as a principle of non-justiciability in the Serdar Mohammed case. 
The majority of Supreme Court judges accept a non-justiciability reading of crown act of state. 
Lord Mance, with whom Lord Hughes agrees, clarifies that it is a principle of abstention: the 
domestic court’s stance should not be out of line with that of its own state in its international 
relations23 and that actions involving foreign states and their citizens may be more appropriately 
pursued at a state-to-state level rather than through domestic courts.24 The Court of Appeal 
understands the purpose of act of state as ensuring that the executive and judiciary ‘speak with the 
same voice’ in matters concerning the conduct of foreign relations.25 However, the Court of 
Appeal notes that the ‘speak with one voice’ principle should only apply in private law claims when 
it is the same for public law claims. But there is no such bar in public law claims on this issue.26 
Lord Sumption argues that the crown act of state has nothing to do with subject matter, but with 
the distinction between domestic rights and international rights. The latter are non-justiciable in 
domestic courts.27 Lord Mance disagrees with Lord Sumption stating that domestic courts are able 
to adjudicate upon and give effect to international law, the prime example being that customary 
international law is justiciable in domestic law.28 They both agree that a non-justiciable act of state 
is one that: must involve an exercise of sovereign power, inherently governmental in nature; done 
outside the UK; with the prior authority or subsequent ratification of the crown; and in the conduct 
of the crown’s relations with other states or their subjects.29 It must be a necessary consequence 
of a decision made by the Crown through its ministers.30 The act of state can extend to relatively 
low level decisions.31 For Lord Mance, Serdar Mohammed’s case was non-justiciable because the 
UK’s actions ‘were steps taken pursuant to or in implementation of a deliberately formed policy 
against persons…reasonably suspected to be insurgents or terrorists in the context and furtherance 
of foreign military operations during a time of armed conflict’.32 For Lord Sumption, the acts of 
state ‘were authorised by the UK’s detention policy or required by the UK’s agreements with the 
US’ and as such were ‘inherently governmental’, and ‘authorised by the Crown’.33  
Four criticisms can be levelled against characterising act of state as a principle of non-justiciability. 
First, act of state as a non-justiciability doctrine is an anachronistic principle that originated in 
colonialist practices of despotic rule and has no place in contemporary governance. Second, act of 
state as a principle of non-justiciability falls far below the standard of ‘high policy’ decisions 
accepted as non-justiciable in contemporary discourse. The day-to-day administration of detention 
policies falls outside normal ambit of ‘high policy’. Third, the judges only review public law non-
justiciability cases despite the fact that this is a private law claim in tort and there is a distinct body 
of case law on non-justiciability in this area of law which points to detention being justiciable. 
 
22 Paul Scott, ‘The Vanishing law of Crown act of state’ (2015) 66(4) NILQ 367; Perreau-Saussine (n 12) 218-245. 
23 Mohammed I (n 4) paras 51, 54 per Lord Mance. 
24 Ibid para 57 per Lord Mance. 
25 Mohammed CA (n 11) 353. 
26 Ibid paras 354-5. 
27 Ibid para 79-80 per Lord Sumption. 
28 Ibid para 58 per Lord Mance citing Keyu v Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [2015] 3 WLR 1665 paras 117-122, 144-
151. 
29 Ibid para 72 per Lord Mance following Lord Sumption at para 81 who takes his lead from Lady Hale para 37. 
30 Ibid para 92 per Lord Sumption. 
31 Ibid para 91 per Lord Sumption. 
32 Ibíd para 75 per Lord Mance. 




Fourth, there is a disparity of treatment by the courts of the prerogative. The courts are much 
more willing to review prerogatives concerning domestic affairs - even if they are prima facie matters 
falling within ‘high policy’ subject matter - than they are willing to review prerogatives which effect 
extraterritorial individuals - even if the latter concerns a traditionally justiciable subject matter. 
Act of State as a Doctrine of Non-justiciability 
Act of state as anachronistic 
First, the judges misrepresent the authorities on act of state. Act of state as a non-justiciability 
doctrine is an anachronistic principle that originated in colonialist practices of despotic rule and 
has no place in contemporary governance.34 The definition of act of state arrived at by the judges 
is not grounded in any judicial authority and does not provide a true representation of its operation.  
Act of state is originally invoked as a device to bar claims against a commercial company, the East 
India Company, with whom the British state has a sui generis relationship, to operate as an aggressive 
colonial power in India.35 At its height, the East India Company had a private army of 200,000 
men supported and funded by the British Parliament with the prime purpose of satisfying its 
shareholders by acquiring property: ‘it was not the British government that began seizing great 
chunks of India in the mid-eighteenth century, but a dangerously unregulated private company 
headquartered in one small office…in London, and managed in India by a violent, utterly ruthless 
and intermittently mentally unstable corporate predator …’.36 The act of state is then invoked to 
condone similar practices conducted by Governors appointed to colonies. 
Lord Mance and Lord Sumption identify Secretary of State in Council of India v Kamachee Boye Sahaba37  
as the main authority for a non-justiciable act of state doctrine.38 Kamachee concerned a case where 
the East India Company, seized the Raj of Tanjore, and the public and private property of the 
deceased Rajah of Tanjore, in the absence of an heir. His widow brought a claim against seizure 
of the private property. However, the actions of the East India Company were not considered 
within the jurisdiction of a court to consider. It was decided that ‘[a]n act done by an agent of the 
Government, though in excess of his authority, being ratified and adopted by the Government, held to 
be equivalent to previous authority’.39 Lord Kingsdown delivering the judgment of the Privy 
Council found that: ‘… the property now claimed by the respondent has been seized by the British 
Government, acting as a Sovereign power, through its delegate the East India Company; and that 
the act so done, with its consequences, is an act of state over which the [Court] has no 
jurisdiction’.40 Much criticism was levelled against invoking act of state doctrine developed in 
Kamachee. Perreau Saussine finds that ‘In Kamachee, the Crown was held to have successfully 
delegated to the East India Company a non-justiciable “sovereign” power to act despotically’.41 
Bethell AG in Kamachee stated that the conduct of the East India Company was ‘a most violent and 
unjustifiable measure’.42 
Crown action overseas is treated as non-justiciable because the imperial expansions involved were 
acts of ‘arbitrary power’ which were not performed ‘under colour of legal title’.43 Precisely because 
the Privy Council was unable to find ‘any ground of legal right’ for a seizure the company’s actions 
 
34 Perreau-Saussine (n 7) 194. 
35 Ibid. 
36 William Dalrymple, The Anarchy: The Relentless Rise of the East India Company (Bloomsbury 2019) Xxv 
37 Secretary of State in Council of India v Kamachee Boye Sahaba (1859) 13 Moore PCC 22 (15ER 9). 
38 Mohammed I (n 4) para 61 per Lord Mance; para 85 per Lord Sumption. 
39 Kamachee (n 37) 476. 
40 Ibid 540.  
41 Perreau-Saussine (n 7) 194. 
42 Kamachee (n 37) 78-79. 




had to be understood as non-justiciable acts of state.44 Justice Leggatt in the High Court concluded 
that the doctrine in Kamachee was “perverse” as “the executive can be held to account if it purports 
to act legally, but not if it openly flouts the law.”45 Lord Mance fails to acknowledge explicitly that 
illegality is a criteria for invocation of act of state but in discussing the present litigation and other 
extraterritorial decisions concedes that the non-justiciability doctrine will operate where there are 
clear rules pronouncing on the legality of an act: ‘What the Supreme Court’s recent decisions 
emphasizes is that the doctrine is not confined to situations in which it can be said that there are 
no judicial or manageable standards’.46  
 
The cases cited by Lord Sumption in support of the proposition that Kamachee is established 
authority for a rule of non-justiciability in low level extraterritorial detention decisions are either 
Privy Council cases particular to the colonialist context and concern annexation of property47 or 
are weak authority because they are unsuccessful invocations of act of state in the 20th century.48 
Lord Sumption’s list fails to mention the invocation of Kamachee to detain without legal authority 
in the colonial context.  The application of Kamachee to detention cases in the process of annexation 
of territory in the 19th century reveals an open contempt for foreign victims of fundamental rights 
violations that would not be acceptable in contemporary decision-making. 
In the Privy Council case, Cook v Sprigg, the appellants sought to enforce rights they claimed had 
been granted to them in concessions made by Sigcau prior to British annexation. The Privy 
Council, invoking Kamachee, found that ‘taking possession by Her Majesty, whether by cession or 
by any other means by which sovereignty can be acquired, was an act of state’ and therefore could 
not be questioned in a court of law.49 Cook v Sprigg resurfaced in the Court of Appeal, The King v 
The Earl of Crew ex p Sekgome.50 The governor was entitled to detain Sekgome either because he was 
empowered to act and legislate under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act 1890 (FJA) or because it was an 
act of state. The FJA declared the Crown’s actions in foreign dominions to be ‘as valid and effectual 
as though the same had been done according to the local law then in force within such Country 
or Place’. The ruling left the High Commissioner legally unaccountable.51 Vaughan Williams LJ 
provided that the decision was ‘made less difficult if one remembers that the Protectorate is over 
a country in which a few dominant civilised men have to control a great multitude of the semi-
barbarous’.52 If the argument about the statutory powers of the Commissioner was ungrounded, 
Sekgome’s detention ‘would be justified as an act of state’.53 Lord Kennedy found that detention 
was an act of state, justifying the detention of Sekgome.54 You cannot usually have legislation 
directed against a particular person, but here the court had not ‘the case of a civilised and orderly 
state, such as modern England or the Rome of Cicero’s time, but the administration of a barbarous 
or, at least, semi-barbarous community’.55  
 
44 Perreau-Saussine (n 7) 194 
45 Mohammed HC (n 9) para 86 per Justice Leggatt.  
46 Lord Mance, ‘International Law in the UK Supreme Court’ (King’s College, London, 13 February 2017) available 
at https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-170213.pdf (last accessed 23rd January 2020). 
47 Sirdar Baghwan Singh v Secretary of State for India [1874] LR 2 Ind App 38, 47; Cook v Sprigg [1899] AC 572; Vajesingji 
Joravarsingji v Secretary of State for India [1924] LR 51 Ind App 357; Secretary of State for India v Sardar Rustam Khan [1941] 
AC 536. 
48 Nissan v Attorney General [1970] AC 179, 218 (Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest), 225 (Lord Pearce), 231-232 (Lord 
Wilberforce), 238 (Lord Pearson); Johnstone v Pedlar [1921] 2 AC 262, 275 (Viscount Cave), 278-279 (Lord 
Atkinson), 290-291 (Lord Sumner); 
49 Cook (n 47) 578. 
50 The King v The Earl of Crewe ex parte Sekgome [1910] 2 K. B. 576 (CA). 
51 Perreau Saussine (n 7) 199. 
52 Sekgome (n 50) 610. 
53 Ibid.  
54 Ibid 609, 624-5 




Perreau Saussine labels the Kamachee, Cook, and Sekgome cases as the ‘autocratic’ act of state cases 
because they are based upon a principle that endorses despotic rule.56 Invoking act of state in 2017 
to justify breaching Afghan law and policy agreements, on detention in favour of retrospective 
decisions authorised by the executive that are not compliant with policy agreements and legal 
authority, is retrogressive in terms of the principles of comity and fundamental rights protections 
abroad.  
Non-Justiciability in Public Law 
Second, the act of state doctrine is a principle of non-justiciability that falls far below the standard 
of ‘high policy’ decisions accepted as non-justiciable in contemporary discourse. The day to day 
administration of detention policies falls outside the normal ambit of ‘high policy’. While act of 
state as a principle of non-justiciability is confined to the private law action, public law 
jurisprudence is invoked to justify and confine this reading of the prerogative power and to 
distinguish it from merely a defence in tort - a conception of act of state for which judges resorting 
to the non-justiciability conception could not find precedent to support. This lower threshold of 
non-justiciability could potentially affect public law cases, especially in the absence of the HRA.  
While the particular area of policy-making itself may call for a degree of judicial deference to the 
superior knowledge or expertise of elected branches this is not, and should not be regarded as 
being the same as making a topic non-justiciable in its entirety. Non-justiciability has been 
described as the ‘nuclear option’57 when courts consider it beyond their competence to exercise 
judicial scrutiny of executive action. This is because invocation of non-justiciability does not only 
affect the outcome of the case before the courts, but could exclude future cases based on similar 
facts from judicial analysis regardless of the merits of the claim and the potential development in 
Strasbourg.58 It is only in exceptional circumstances that a doctrine of non-justiciability is invoked 
and the use of the doctrine has been limited in the interest of constitutional legitimacy including 
the separation of powers principle, parliamentary democracy and the rule of law. GCHQ provides 
an authoritative list of matters that may be characterised as ‘high policy’ and beyond judicial 
scrutiny. In GCHQ the courts decided that whether or not a case was justiciable did not depend 
upon the source of the law: prerogative powers were justiciable. But certain issues may be non-
justiciable depending upon their subject matter.59 Lord Roskill clarified the subject matter that 
would not be justiciable: ‘those relating to the making of treaties, the defence of the realm, the 
prerogative of mercy, the grant of honours, the dissolution of parliament and the appointment of 
ministers as well as others…’.60  This is a non-exhaustive list.  
However, the HRA made questions pertaining to Convention rights justiciable even in matters of 
‘high policy’:61 ‘it is now common ground that if a Convention right requires the court to examine 
and adjudicate upon matters which were previously regarded as non-justiciable, then adjudicate we 
must’.62 ‘High policy’ decisions that may be non-justiciable include questions of international 
significance upon which no consensus in international law or policy has been reached. These are 
high level decisions of an abstract and far-reaching nature upon which there is no state consensus 
or upon which the UK domestic courts feel is outside of its control to pronounce upon unilaterally. 
One of the prime examples is in R (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament) v Prime Minister of the United 
Kingdom63 the claimants sought a declaration that it would be contrary to international law for the 
UK to use force against Iraq without a UNSCR authorising such action under the UN Charter. 
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The divisional court found the case non-justiciable because it would be contrary to ‘public interest’ 
for it to adjudicate upon such matters.64 The legality of the use of force against Iraq depended 
upon whether or not it constituted an exception to the customary international law prohibition on 
the use of force, and in particular whether UNSCR 1441 authorised an exception to the rule.  The 
applicants argued that ‘the ius cogens prohibition on the use of force was part of the common law 
in the absence of any contrary legislation; that it was asking the court to determine not a factual or 
policy issue but a "clinical point of law"; and that to leave it within the exclusive province of the 
executive would be contrary to the rule of law’.65  
The court invoked the doctrine of the separation of powers to characterise the legality of the 
Government's decision to go to war as non-justiciable. Foreign policy and deployment of armed 
forces remained ‘forbidden areas’,66 and ‘international law must often be left ‘as shades of grey and 
open for diplomatic negotiation’ as clear articulation of the international law position would 
undermine Government negotiations.67 Perreau-Saussine notes that this reasoning conflicts with 
the International Court of Justice decision of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons: ‘Whatever its political 
aspects, the Court cannot refuse to admit the legal character of a question which invites it to 
discharge an essentially judicial task, namely, an assessment of the legality of the possible conduct 
of States with regard to the obligations imposed on them by international law’.68 Simon Brown L.J. 
stated that ‘the common law encompasses customary international law’.69 However, he also held 
that UNSCR 1441 had the status of an ‘unincorporated treaty’, and therefore constituted 
‘international law in no way bearing on the application of domestic law’… there was ‘simply no 
foothold in domestic law for any ruling to be given on international law’.70 Perreau-Saussine 
criticises this aspect of the judgment arguing that if customary international law is part of the 
common law, the executive must obey it as a matter of law rather than as a matter of choice.71 
Justice Leggatt found that act of state as a non-justiciability rule had no application in the present 
case because it was within the capacity of the courts to adjudicate on detention. Lady Hale 
agreed: 
 including detention as a non-justiciable subject matter would mean expanding the 
meaning of non-justiciability to situations that have not been covered by that rule 
previously. It would not only encompass high policy decisions but also aspects of the 
conduct of military operations, ‘even though their subject matter was entirely suitable for 
determination by the court.72  
The adoption of a non-justiciability conception of act of state is therefore concerning as it signals 
the lack of willingness to adjudicate extraterritorially on matters that are usually central to the 
judicial role as is indicated in the content of article 5 itself which prohibits deprivation of liberty 
except when a court has decided that the individual should be detained following conviction by a 
court73 or in cases where the individual is detained in order to bring them before a competent court 
to decide the lawfulness of detention.74 Furthermore, a procedural safeguard enshrined in article 
 
64 Ibid Lord Simon Brown para 47(ii); Lord Richards paras 55-58. 
65 Amanda Perreau-Saussine, ‘The shades of grey in the rule of international law’ (2003) 62(3) CLJ 538, 538. 
66 Kay J citing (Abbassi) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2002] EWCA Civ 1598 par 106 per 
Lord Phillips M.R.  
67 R (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament) (n 63) para 60 per Judge Richard. 
68 Perreau-Saussine, ‘The shades of grey in the rule of international law’ (n 65) 539 citing [1996] ICJ. Reports 226, 
para 13. 
69 R (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament) (n 63) para 40 per Lord Simon Brown. 
70 Ibid para 36, 47 per Lord Simon Brown.  
71 Ibid 540. 
72 Mohammed I (n 4) para 33 Lady Hale. 
73 Article 5(1) (a). 




5(4) is that the lawfulness of detention is contingent upon the ability to be able to have the 
lawfulness of the detention speedily towards the court.75  
Non-justiciability in Tort Law 
Third, detention is not a non-justiciable issue in English tort law. Lords Mance and Sumption do 
not assess whether a doctrine of non-justiciability can bar an action in tort despite the fact that the 
act is justiciable under public law. They do not consider the tort position at all, only relying on 
public law cases to assess justiciability whilst denying that their non-justiciability doctrine extends 
to the public law claim. The purpose of tort law claims is not only compensation, but also 
deterrence and accountability. Immunity from a tort claim obstructs all of the functions of tort. 
This is not withstanding the fact that a parallel plea under the HRA may exist. False imprisonment 
is a trespass tort aiming to protect fundamental rights and challenging the legality of detention is 
actionable per se. 76 While recent cases may have limited the extent to which damages can be 
awarded in tort when the applicants cannot show any tangible harm from detention, this does not 
take away from the fact that tort acknowledges challenging alleged unlawful detention as actionable 
per se.77 
A disparity can arise between the tort law and HRA position on justiciability – they do not have 
to hold the same legal position, although in the interests of legal certainty and the rule of law it is 
beneficial for both bodies of law to align. A disparity often arises in relation to positive obligations 
arising under Article 2 HRA in the context of public authorities and the police failing to take active 
steps to protect life, especially where the police is expected to protect a person’s life against a third 
party.78 However, even the disparity relating to positive obligations and the right to life is closing. 
Smith v Ministry of Defence concerned a duty of care owed by the state to servicemen for failing to 
provide adequate equipment and training on the battlefield, leading to the death of soldiers while 
serving in Iraq.79 The Supreme Court held, dismissing any precedent to the contrary, that common 
law tort aligned with the position under Article 2 ECHR that a positive obligation existed to protect 
the life of the soldiers. The interaction between tort and the HRA, between a duty of care 
owed/claims in negligence versus positive obligations in terms of what public authorities are 
expected to do to prevent harm to individuals is still contentious, mutable, and gives rise to 
divergence. But as a result of the HRA, the ability to use non-justiciability to block the claim has 
been seriously undermined.80 Detention is different. It concerns a trespass tort, false or unlawful 
imprisonment, and operates to protect fundamental rights. It is always actionable per se. Under 
the applicable Afghan law, the imprisonment was unlawful and justiciable.  
In a High Court decision that followed the Serdar Mohammed litigation, in Alseran v Ministry of Defence, 
Leggatt in effect rejects that a matter can be non-justiciable under the tort law claim whilst being 
justiciable under the HRA.81 Leggatt invokes the principle that parliament can displace and 
override a prerogative power with legislation and that act of state, so far as it concerns detention 
practices, has been overridden by the HRA. Leggatt found there was a basis of liability for the 
unlawful imprisonments and batteries of claimants under Iraqi law. He considered whether the 
crown act of state doctrine applied if the conduct and/or policy in question was unlawful as matter 
of English domestic law. Leggatt held that the doctrine does not apply where a particular 
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government policy of a kind which is judicially reviewable is unlawful in English domestic law and 
therefore outside the scope of the government’s legal powers. 82 Ultra vires policies and acts have 
no legal effect and can give rise to the Crown’s liability in tort.83 Being contrary to LOAC and the 
HRA 1998, such policies were unlawful under English domestic law and therefore ultra vires.84 It 
is in practice a rejection of the position adopted by the Supreme Court. The government policy or 
decision must comply with English domestic law, including the HRA. The dichotomy between 
private and public law is eroded by Leggatt. 
Grušić explains the judgment as Leggatt connecting private and public law.85 But it is important to 
note that Leggatt goes further: he erodes the dichotomy between the private and public law claim 
so far as the question of justiciability is concerned. Grušić’s explanation is the following: 
It is through this process that a question of tort law and private international law (Is there 
a tortious claim against the crown which concerns governmental acts committed abroad?) 
becomes a question of domestic public law (is the government’s policy in question 
judicially reviewable and unlawful as a matter of English domestic law and ultra vires?), 
which in turn becomes a question of public international law (Has the government’s policy 
violated [LOAC] and human rights standards?).86  
Mance and Sumption did not consider the doctrine of non-justiciability in tort law and only 
relied upon public law cases. Their assessment was of whether the matter was justiciable under 
public law and therefore speaks to the claim under the HRA. Reiterating Leggatt and the Court 
of Appeal, a finding of non-justiciability would preclude both actions, and this would be 
illegitimate because it is well established that this type of detention case is justiciable under the 
HRA. In Alseran, Justice Leggatt rejects the Chinese wall created by the Supreme Court between 
the private and public law claim, act of state as non-justiciability running parallel with the HRA 
claim. 
Non-justiciability: Disparity between Domestic and International Cases 
Fourth, to label extraterritorial detention as a non-justiciable subject matter is to reinforce the 
binary between domestic and extraterritorial state action in the common law. As previously stated, 
the orthodox position is that non-justiciability is considered as a ‘nuclear option’ and ‘high policy’ 
matters that preclude judicial adjudication have a high threshold e.g. questions of international 
significance upon which no consensus in international law or policy has been reached. However, 
the courts increasingly contradict this orthodoxy along jurisdictional lines. The courts have 
demonstrated an increased willingness to adjudicate upon matters traditionally understood as 
matters of ‘high policy’ in the domestic sphere, while declining to adjudicate upon non-HRA, lower 
level matters upon which clear legal and/or policy guidelines exist in the extraterritorial domain.  
This results in a disparity of treatment and perceived worth between those situated within the UK’s 
territory as compared with those situated outside of the territory where the rights violation occurs. 
A binary does exist between the national and the foreigner but is not limited to that: it is a binary 
between those who stay and those who leave. The introduction of act of state, which creates a 
presumption that people affected outside UK territory will not have any legal recourse against the 
UK in British courts, reinforces further this dichotomy. 
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Miller v Secretary of State for Exiting the EU87 (Miller I) and Miller v Prime Minister88 (Miller II) are two 
noteworthy cases where the Supreme Court found that the prerogatives, despite falling prime facie 
within the ‘high policy’ matters of making and leaving treaties and prorogation of parliament 
respectively, were nevertheless justiciable. The applicant was furthermore successful in challenging 
the executive action in both cases. In contrast, non-HRA extraterritorial cases89 such as Bancoult 
(No 2),90 Noor Khan,91 Sandiford,92  demonstrate the UK courts’ unwillingness to review an 
extraterritorial matter/prerogative instead labelling it as ‘non-justiciable’, and if not non-justiciable, 
then subject to a severely limited form of review, leaving the applicant with no judicial, or 
alternative remedy. The courts are invoking the language of ‘rights’ in the domestic context to 
justify review of archetypal prerogative powers, while placing little weight on the rights of those 
harmed extraterritorially. 
In Bancoult (No 2),93 the House of Lords held that the prerogative power to expel the indigenous 
population of the Chagos Islands was non-justiciable. The Chagos islands were a dependency of 
Mauritius when it was ceded to the UK by France in 1814 and until 1965 were administered as 
part of that colony. In 1966 the UK Government agreed to allow the US to use the largest of the 
Chagos Islands, Diego Garcia, as a military base. The UK therefore made the British Indian Ocean 
Territories Order 1965 SI No 1920 (the BIOT order) which, under the Colonial Boundaries Act 
1895, detached the Chagos islands from the colony of Mauritius and constituted them a separate 
colony known as BIOT.94 The order created the office of Commissioner of BIOT and conferred 
upon him power to ‘make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Territory’. Under 
these powers the Commissioner for BIOT made the Immigration Ordinance 1971. Section 4 of 
the Ordinance made it unlawful for a person to be in the BIOT without a permit and empowered 
the Commissioner to make an order directing that person’s removal. Between 1968 and 1973 the 
UK Government procured the removal and resettlement of the Chagossians. The UK paid some 
compensation for the harm suffered by the displaced Chagossians.95 Litigation began in 1998 for 
the declaration that Immigration Ordinance 1971 was void which was successful and the 
Commissioner revoked the ordinance.96 However, following an examination of the feasibility of 
resettling Chagossians to the islands, including discontent from the US, the immigration controls 
were reintroduced by s 9 of the Constitution Order and an Order in Council (Immigration Order) 
in 2004. Chagossians needed immigration consent even to visit the islands. The current litigation 
challenged the 2004 order. 
The judgment begins by acknowledging that as BIOT was ceded to the Crown, the executive has 
a prerogative power to legislate for the Territory97 and it was for the court to determine the limits 
of that power. Lord Hoffmann found that a prerogative Order in Council was primary legislation 
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and not subordinate98 but was not the same as an Act of Parliament because it was not 
democratically accountable and was judicially reviewable on the grounds of legality, irrationality 
and procedural impropriety.99 However he found the proposition that the Crown did not have 
power to remove an islander’s right of abode in BIOT ‘too extreme’.100 For him, there was ‘no 
basis for saying that the right of abode was in its nature so fundamental’ that the crown could not 
touch it.101 Hoffmann rejected the argument that the powers of the Crown were limited to 
legislation for the ‘peace, order and good government’ of the Territory, and therefore for the 
benefit of the inhabitants.102 Where there is a conflict of interests the crown is entitled to legislate 
in the interests of the UK.103 In terms of judicial review, it is not irrational to deny the right of 
abode on the grounds that it is uneconomic104 and was not in the interest of UK security.105 
Lords Rodger and Carswell decided against the applicants on the grounds that the Colonial Laws 
Validity Act of 1865 ousted the jurisdiction of English courts to review the scope and exercise of 
powers of colonial government and that the order in question was an example of such a power. 
However, Lord Rodgers considered whether the order in council was reviewable and, although 
agreed with Hoffmann that prerogative orders may be reviewable per se, thought that this order 
in council was not justiciable insofar as considering the question of whether it was made for the 
‘peace, order and good government of the Territory’. Parliament would have to intervene if it felt 
that the power had been exercised incorrectly.106 He agreed with Lord Hoffmann that the order 
was not irrational on economic and security grounds.107 Arguments based on the legitimate 
expectation created by Bancoult I litigation were rejected.108 The case testifies to the frigidity with 
which each branch of governance confronts its colonial past. This frigidity is a hallmark of the 
colonial mindset, which is operationalised through the prerogative power.  
Noor Kahn concerned the targeted killing by a drone operated by the CIA of 40 people attending a 
peaceful council of trial elders including the applicant’s father.109 The strike was facilitated by 
GCHQ intelligence. The claimant argued that the lack of a formulated legal policy and practice in 
handing over intelligence to the CIA involved requiring GCHQ officers to encourage and/or assist 
the commission of murder.110 The courts found that the case was non-justiciable because in the 
course of adjudicating upon the actions of the UK, it would be necessary to make a statement on 
the legality of action of the US. Lord Justice Laws found that ‘a finding by our court that the 
notional UK operator of a drone bomb which caused a death was guilty of murder would inevitably 
be understood…by the US as a condemnation of the US… What matters is that the findings would 
be understood by the US authorities as critical of them’.111 However, the implicit condemnation 
of another state’s actions does not take away from the fact that it is the lawfulness of the UK’s 
inaction, according to UK law, that is under scrutiny. The latter reasoning has in the past resulted 
in a successful action against the UK for failing to make the US return a prisoner of war from a 
US base in Afghanistan to a British base in Iraq to prevent against inhumane and degrading 
treatment.112 The Joint Committee on Human Rights has since expressed grave concerns about 
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the transparency of procedures in UK targeted killings.113 The scale of unaccountable UK targeted 
killings has been raised as a matter of concern by the All Party Parliamentary Group on Drones. 
To find this subject matter non-justiciable on the grounds that it would mean inadvertently 
criticising the conduct of another state illustrates a disregard for the individuals affected. 
In Sandiford the courts found the decision of the Secretary of State to withhold legal aid for a final 
appeal by a British citizen convicted of drug smuggling and sentenced to death in Indonesia 
reviewable because it did not raise real issues of foreign policy.114 But they could only review the 
Secretary of State’s decision in accordance with their published guide. The Support for British 
Nationals Abroad: a Guide 2007 provided that the UK government could not give legal advice or 
start legal proceedings on behalf of nationals facing capital punishment abroad. They could provide 
a list of local interpreters and lawyers but could not any financial assistance. The applicant sought 
to challenge the blanket nature of the policy. The courts did not find this policy irrational.115 There 
was a financial justification for not providing funding because there were a number of death 
penalty cases arising. Despite refusing to criticise the blanket ban on funding, Lords Carnwath and 
Mance stated that ‘logic and consistency call for an urgent review of the policy as it applies to 
Sandford’.116 The mitigating factors in her case included her age (she was 57), she had mental 
problems, she had no previous record, she had cooperated with the police to bring to justice 
members of the drug syndicate, the sentence was disproportionate, and the fees for the lawyer 
were relatively cheap.117 Further, ‘under the pre-2007 policy, the Foreign Office did not experience 
real difficulty in controlling and limiting the financial exposure which it incurred in a few 
exceptional cases’.118 This case was ‘extreme’ in terms of the injustice that would accrue as a result 
of the lack of funding. But this appraisal did not affect the outcome which was to not award 
financial help to Sandiford. 
Cases that do not fall within the jurisdiction of the HRA and concern executive exercise of the 
prerogative abroad illustrate the deference of the courts towards the executive. Even when 
fundamental rights are at stake such as the right to life – the right not to be assassinated, the right 
not to be subjected to the death penalty – and the right to believe to return to your home.119 The 
re-emergence of act of state in the 21st century in cases falling under the HRA, with an unforeseen 
potential as an enabler of unchecked executive action, signals a lack of empathy for the 
extraterritorial individual that is reminiscent of the colonial mindset. 
Deference in the Public Law Claim: Act of state and the Decline of 
International law adjudication 
Reinstatement of act of state marks a departure from the increasingly expansive approach adopted 
by the UK courts to extraterritorial human rights adjudication. While act of state is confined to 
the private law claim, and not a ban on an extraterritorial action under the HRA, the public law 
case accompanying the private law case, both handed down on the same day and both pertaining 
to the case of Serdar Mohammed, demonstrates a change in judicial attitude towards the 
extraterritorial application of human rights in armed conflict. The courts are less willing to question 
the extraterritorial actions of the executive even when no clear legal authority exists for their action 
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or arguably when the law expressly prohibits the action. The judgment also reveals a lack of 
willingness by the court to enforce or clarify international law obligations through the HRA.  
Prior to the Supreme Court’s Serdar Mohammed judgments, UK courts adopted an increasingly 
expansive approach to the extraterritorial application of human rights. In 2013, in Smith v Ministry 
of Defence, the Supreme Court confirmed that the HRA extended to securing the protection of the 
right to life, under article 2 ECHR, to members of the armed forces when they were serving outside 
its territory in a case where British soldiers alleged they were killed in Iraq as a result of inadequate 
equipment.120 This resulted in a successful claim in negligence against the state. The Supreme Court 
accepted the test of extraterritoriality adopted by the ECtHR in Al Skeini v UK of ‘state agent 
authority and control’ which enabled the jurisdiction of the ECHR to be triggered when one state 
agent breached the rights of another individual.121 However, the Supreme Court went further than 
the ECtHR in extraterritorial accountability insofar as it was the first case in which armed forces 
of a Member State claimed extraterritorial rights under the ECHR, and the court imposed on the 
state positive obligations to protect the right to life extraterritorially. This was not a matter of 
merely questioning the legality of a particular use of force or requiring an investigation to be carried 
out into the death.122  
Al-Saadoon & Ors v Secretary of State for Defence123 concerned a number of claims relating to British 
military involvement in Iraq between 2003 and 2009,  including ill-treatment, unlawful detention, 
and unlawful killing of Iraqi civilians. The High Court found that the HRA could extend to 
situations where control was exercised through the use of physical force alone.124 The Court of 
Appeal applied a more limited approach but with the same outcome: that ECHR accountability 
extended to unlawful killing. However, in order for jurisdiction to be established the applicant had 
to demonstrate ‘a greater degree of power and control than that represented by the use of lethal 
force . . . alone’125 for example being a detainee or because some of the public powers were 
exercised by the Member State in Iraq e.g. maintaining peace and security. The fact that the HRA 
was applicable in a case where someone was killed by UK armed forces in an overseas military 
intervention represented an expansive approach to extraterritoriality. 
Serdar Mohammed was the first time that the ECHR would apply to military intervention in 
Afghanistan. It would provide a blueprint for other Council of Europe states and the ECtHR, in 
deciding upon the application of the ECHR to ‘internationalised’ non-international armed conflict 
(NIAC) and would represent a significant expansion of extraterritorial adjudication. An 
‘internationalised’ NIAC is widely used to denote multinational military interventions taking place 
in one state’s territory between multiple state and non-state actors. It is distinguished from a NIAC 
because of the involvement of international states, and it is differentiated from an international 
armed conflict (IAC) because of the involvement of non-state actors and the centralisation of 
conflict in one territory. While traditionally only human rights regulated detention in NIACs, and 
LOAC regulated detention in an IAC, whether or not the more permissive LOAC regime should 
regulate detention in an ‘internationalised’ NIAC remained (and remains) a controversial question. 
The ECHR only permits detention on seven exhaustive grounds.126 Internment was not permitted 
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in the absence of a derogation.127 But in light of the exigencies of NIACs many argue that it should 
be allowed as long as there is a legal basis for it and the proper procedural safeguards are in place.128 
Among those who take this position, it is a contentious question as to whether LOAC can be a 
legal basis for detention in NIACs.129 The main question which the UK courts had to consider in 
the public law claim under the HRA was whether they should apply human rights standards to the 
exclusion of LOAC in detention in Afghanistan and prohibit detention that did not fall within any 
of the exceptions listed in Article 5. In different ways, all of the courts were reluctant to find that 
human rights could not accommodate – at least partially – the detention of Serdar Mohammed, 
and the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court were reluctant to rely on human rights standards, 
instead focusing on LOAC and UNSCRs respectively. But the Supreme Court’s approach was 
significant in the extent of the deference it demonstrated to the executive. 
Also in question where more abstract questions such as the extent to which domestic courts could 
contribute to the development of international law in this unclear area of law, and the point at 
which domestic court decisions could become a source of international law. If the courts were to 
resolve not to interpret the HRA through the lens of LOAC in a NIAC, and instead prohibit 
internment, they would be applying the status quo rather than contributing to the development of 
international law. But commentators believed that at least to a certain extent, and with all 
procedural safeguards in place, internment should be permitted in the more complex forms of 
NIACs. The main question was whether human rights standards (prohibition on internment) 
should apply to the exclusion of LOAC (circumstances in which internment is permitted) in 
detention cases in Afghanistan.  
The High Court and Court of Appeal in Serdar Mohammed found a violation of article 5 ECHR in 
the case of an Afghan detained by the UK for longer than 96 hours. The High Court and Court 
of Appeal reached this decision primarily by engaging in an adjudication of the human rights and 
potential LOAC rights for determining the outcome. The Supreme Court arrived at the decision 
that indefinite internment could potentially be permitted under a UNSCR that stated that Member 
States were authorised to do whatever was ‘necessary for imperative reasons of security’.  
The Supreme Court decision creates worrying precedent. First, the majority found that the relevant 
UNSCRs could potentially authorise detention in Afghanistan indefinitely using the wording that 
the Member States were authorised to do what was ‘necessary for imperative reasons of security’. 
Although UNSCRs are a source of international law,130 the Supreme Court has in effect rejected 
substantive international law in favour of wide reaching and ill-defined powers accorded to states 
by the Security Council. Contrary to the High Court and Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court 
concluded obiter dicta that there was a right to detain under LOAC treaty and customary law in 
NIACs, but ultimately did not rely on the essential question of the relationship between these two 
significant bodies of international law, LOAC and human rights. Instead they pointed to UNSCRs 
to condone the decisions of the executive. The Supreme Court then decided that article 5 ECHR 
could accommodate exceptional grounds of detention when authorised by UNSCRs.  
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The case: Human Rights, LOAC and UNSCRs 
Serdar Mohammed was detained for 110 days from April-July 2010. The states taking part in the 
ISAF had agreed upon detention for up to 96 hours in SOP 362 before the detainee had to be 
transferred to Afghan authorities with limited exceptions to this rule (including if a delay arose 
because of an inability to transfer the prisoner). Afghan domestic law permitted detention for up 
to 72 hours.  Justice Leggatt in the High Court had split the period of detention into three different 
timeframes. The first timeframe consisted of the first 96 hours of detention (ISAF policy deadline 
before detainee had to be transferred to Afghan authorities). Justice Leggatt argued that he was 
bound by the Al Jedda House of Lords decision wherein it was stated that where a UNSCR and 
human rights conflict, the UNSCR trumps the human right, and that the UNSCR constituted a 
binding obligation.131 Leggatt then accepted that the UNSCR gave authorization to detain but not 
outside the ISAF policy (96 hours) or the Afghan criminal justice system (72 hours).132  
 
However, he found the requirements of the ISAF policy were compliant with the exception to 
prohibition against deprivation of liberty under article 5(1)(c) ECHR - detention ‘for the purpose 
of bringing him before an Afghan prosecutor or judge’ and that it cannot have been a coincidence 
that the four day limit used by ISAF was compliant with ECtHR jurisprudence on this matter.133 
In conclusion, ‘the applicable UNSCR authorized detention by UK armed forces participating in 
ISAF only for such time as was necessary to deliver the detained person to Afghan authorities, and 
ISAF’s policy was within the scope of this authorisation’.134 Justice Leggatt found that the 
‘applicable UNSCRs conferred on UK armed forces participating in ISAF authority to detain 
people where this was considered necessary to fulfil ISAF’s mandate’.135  
 
The second timeframe was from 11 April – 4 May 2010 during which time Serdar Mohammed was 
held for intelligence purposes and the third period was when Serdar Mohammed was waiting to be 
transferred to Afghan authorities from 4 May – 25 July. Justice Leggatt applied human rights 
standards to conclude that detention for intelligence purposes was illegal. For the remainder of 
detention he was held in custody ‘on the decision of Ministers and officials without being brought 
before a judge, and without being given any opportunity to challenge the lawfulness of his 
detention’ and did not fall within any of the exceptional grounds under article 5.136 In terms of the 
application of LOAC, he found that even though it was possible for LOAC to be used in the 
interpretation of human rights if a state derogated from the pure application of human rights he 
was not convinced that LOAC could ‘provide a legal basis for detention in situations of non-
international armed conflict’.137  
 
The government appealed the decisions on the second and third period. Since the High Court 
decision, the ECtHR had handed down Hassan v UK which was significant insofar as it confirmed 
that states did not have to derogate from the ECHR in order to interpret human rights, and in 
particular article 5, through the lens of LOAC thereby allowing detention without charge in 
specified circumstances.138 This constituted an exception to what had previously been construed 
as an exhaustive list of grounds of detention. The judgment strictly concerned IACs and not 
NIACs. The Court of Appeal accepted that human rights standards could be interpreted through 
the lens of LOAC without a derogation. But it reasoned that Hassan could be extended to the 
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present case only if it could be confirmed that LOAC provided a legal basis for detention in NIACs 
thereby accepting the prima facie position that the detention was illegal on the face of the HRA. 
The Court of Appeal could not find a legal basis for the detention beyond 96 hours in the 
UNSCRs, Afghan law, or LOAC, despite the very detailed consideration of both treaty and 
customary law when considering the latter. Therefore, under the HRA, the detention was illegal. 
The Court of Appeal could also not point to any English legislation that allowed for a detention 
policy that departed from the other legal frameworks, and intimated that this may have been 
enough to make the detention non-arbitrary. The Court of Appeal, unlike Justice Leggatt, found 
that act of state was not applicable in the present case and that the claimants were eligible for a 
remedy in tort. 
 
The Supreme Court decision takes a different turn. The majority in Serdar Mohammed found that 
there was a breach of article 5 insofar as he was detained for intelligence purposes from 11 April 
– 4 May 2010. However, of that majority, many agreed that if it could be argued that the detainee 
was held for a simultaneous purpose, for ‘imperative reasons of security’, then the detention could 
be labelled as legal.139  The Supreme Court held that there was no breach while he was waiting to 
be transferred to Afghan authorities from 4 May – 25 July140 because during this time he was being 
held for ‘imperative reasons of security’ as well as for logistical reasons. 
The UK had to pay compensation so far as the duration of the detention (including any detention 
pursuant to his conviction by court in Afghanistan) was prolonged by his detention for intelligence 
purposes.141 Doubts were expressed as to whether any overall detriment had been suffered because 
he would have been transferred and detained to the Afghan authorities after the initial 96 hours, 
and this would impact reward of damages.142 It is worth mentioning the decision on the conditions 
of detention. There was a breach of the procedural obligation under article 5(4) as there was 
‘insufficient institutional guarantees of impartiality’ because the reviewing authority was not 
independent of those responsible for authorising the detention under review143 and there was no 
participation of the detainee in the review process.144 Lord Mance in the Supreme Court did not 
agree there was a breach of article 5(4) because he believed that his participation would not have 
made a difference to his detention. 
UNSCR authorisation: ‘necessary for imperative reasons of security’ 
The Supreme Court found that the relevant UNSCRs authorised detention beyond the 96 hour 
period using the wording that the Member States were authorised to do what was ‘necessary for 
imperative reasons of security’.145 Lord Sumption stated that the UNSCRs146 ‘could constitute an 
authority binding in international law to do that which would otherwise be illegal in international 
law’147 even if authorisation to breach international obligations was only implicit rather than 
explicit.148 The authorisation given to troop-contributing states in Afghanistan by UNSCR to use 
‘all necessary measures’ included detention of members of the opposing armed forces when this 
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was required for imperative reasons of security, even if the detention was contrary to human rights 
or the laws of armed conflict.149 This was because of the jus cogens nature of UNSCRs.150 Lord 
Sumption stated that it would be impractical if a regional human right system required certain 
Member States of a multi-national force to adopt a detention policy that was distinct from the 
ISAF policy,151 without acknowledging that it was the UK’s departure from the multinational 
agreement embodied in the ISAF policy that was so contentious. Lord  
Lord Sumption relied upon the House of Lords Al Jedda decision as authority for the position that 
UNSCRs could trump human rights.152 Al Jedda was detained for 3 years with no charge or trial. 
The US Secretary of State Mr Powell had adjoined a letter to UNSCR 1546 (2003) expressly 
authorising internment in Iraq in the interests of what was necessary for the maintenance and 
security of the region. What was at issue was whether this was a mere power rather than an 
obligation imposed by the UNSC to intern and then whether the UNSCR trumped the human 
rights position prohibiting internment. The House of Lords found that the UNSCR had 
peremptory force under Article 103 UN Charter, and was thereby an obligation which trumped 
the ECHR.153 The ECtHR did not agree with the House of Lords decision. It found that ‘in the 
event of any ambiguity in the terms of a [UNSCR], the court must…choose the interpretation 
which is most in harmony with the requirements of the Convention’: ‘clear and explicit language’ 
is required if the UNSCR intends states to take particular measures which would conflict with their 
obligations under the ECHR.154 In the application of this principle to the facts of the case, the 
ECHR did not think that Mr Powell’s letter provided clear enough authority for the proposition 
that states should intern. Instead they found that it was merely one of the ‘broad range of tasks’ 
that could be undertaken, and that the ‘terminology appears to leave the choice of the means to 
achieve this end to the Member States within [MNF]’155 
Justice Leggatt in the High Court had recognised that he was bound by the House of Lords Al 
Jedda decision rather than the ECtHR’s approach, unless and until the Supreme Court departed 
from that decision. But he felt that the interpretation given by the House of Lords to UNSCR 
1546 did not oblige him to read UNSCR 1890 relating to Afghanistan in the same way as the 
former UNSCR had a letter attached explicitly condoning internment whereas the latter did not.156 
He found that the UNSCR did provide authority for the detention up to 96 hours upon which 
ISAF had an agreed policy, but not beyond. Taking into account the principles developed in the 
ECtHR’s Al Jedda decision, he concluded that there was nothing in the language of UNSCR 1890 
that demonstrated an intention to require or authorise detention contrary to human rights. For 
him, human rights condoned the detention for up to 96 hours for the purpose of bringing him 
before a competent judge. But not beyond. The Court of Appeal concludes that the UK is acting 
outside UNSCR 1890, that the detention beyond 96 hours cannot be attributed to the UN, and 
that therefore the detention beyond 96 hours is attributable to the UK and within the jurisdiction 
of the courts to examine. 
The reliance on an ambiguously worded UNSCR as the legal basis of detention in the first 96 hour 
period is unfortunate throughout the Serdar Mohammed litigation. Finding that the first 96 hours 
were compliant with article 5(1)(c) and referring to the ISAF policy as an indication of an intent 
of good will, would not have been enough to secure the legality of the detention in the first 96 
hours because it is unlikely that the ISAF policy would have provided the requisite legal basis for 
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the detention in the absence of its grounding in the peremptory force of the UNSCR, but Afghan 
law, allowing 72 hours detention, might have enabled a first period of detention to be legal. Justice 
Leggatt obviously did not want to conclude that the entire detention was illegal and wanted to 
provide an indication of circumstances of where terrorist suspects could be detained legally in 
Afghanistan. As Justice Leggatt remarked himself, the House of Lords Al Jedda decision need never 
have been significant because he could have simply found that there was no conflict between the 
UNSCR and human rights. The truth of the matter was that internment without a derogation and 
without a legal basis under the ECHR was illegal. The UK authorities should have put in place 
legislation that they would intern for a certain justified period as was done in the Northern Irish 
context157 according the policy some democratic legitimacy, although with a democratic deficit 
arising in relation to the lack of agreement and participation in the law-making process of other 
participating member states and the Afghan authorities.  
Reliance on the UNSCR as a legal basis for some of the detention in the first period opened the 
door to a much broader interpretation of the UNSCR in the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court 
litigation. If we consider Perreau-Saussine’s analogy between act of state and UNSCRs as an 
authority for Member States to have discretion in their actions against foreigners we can 
understand the problems with placing so much power in ambiguously worded UNSCRs:   
On this account, the Security Council can authorise the exercise of autocratic acts of state, 
constrained only by its self-understanding of the laws of war. In effect this treats the 
[UNSC] as a foreign sovereign whose acts of state fall outside the jurisdiction of British 
courts’.158 
The qualification is worthy of Kafka: here a right to be free from internment is trumped 
by an obligation to intern. 
The End of a Right to Liberty? 
In the end the majority conclude that UNSCRs trump human rights norms but also that article 5 
can accommodate the rights-violating UNSCR. In other words, article 5 has been emptied of its 
protective force. The executive can point to an ambiguously worded UNSCR as authorisation for 
indefinite detention in a NIAC.  
The Supreme Court found that Hassan v UK was authority for the proposition that article 5 ECHR 
can be interpreted so as to accommodate an international law power of detention which is not 
among the permissible occasions for detention listed in article 5(1).159 The Court of Appeal had 
stated that, by parity of reasoning with Hassan, ‘if detention under the Geneva Conventions in an 
IAC can be a ground for detention that is compatible with Article 5 ECHR, it is difficult to see 
why detention under the UN Charter and UNSCRs cannot also be a ground that is compatible 
with Article 5’160 thus providing a misguided forerunner for the Supreme Court decision. But in 
the latter judgment they did not conclude that the UNSCR had authorised detention. The ECtHR 
would not authorise article 5 to accommodate indefinite detention. Hassan is not authority for this 
position. ECtHR on jurisprudence both before and after Hassan indicate that the ECtHR follows 
the position adopted in its Al Jedda decision: that UNSCRs will be interpreted to be in conformity 
with human rights unless ‘clear and explicit’ language provides otherwise.161 The act of state 
doctrine resonates through this aspect of the decision – emptying article 5 ECHR of its content in 
relation to the treatment by Member States of foreigners (but going arguably further than the 
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original conception of act of state and extending to nationals) situated in a territory. It is hoped 
that the ECtHR has an opportunity to confirm that Hassan is not authority for the proposition 
that article 5 can accommodate otherwise rights-violating UNSCRs. 
Concluding Remarks 
One may argue that the introduction of the act of state doctrine merely as a defence to a private 
claim but not a block to the public claim is a reasonable outcome of limited significance because 
it will not have practical ramifications on the ability of the complainant to successfully claim a 
remedy under the HRA, albeit that the applicant may not be awarded as much in damages under 
the HRA as in tort law.162 However, the judgments are collectively significant on a number of levels 
and have a number of negative ramifications on rights protection.  
First, if the private law claim denotes a practice as non-justiciable whereas the public law claim 
treats it as justiciable, a disparity in outcome and reasoning between private and public law claims 
can provide confusion about what is or should be permissible behaviour by the state which is 
contrary to the rule of law.163 The rule of law requires the provision of clear and consistent rules, 
providing stability, foreseeability and a frame one can point to in holding governing powers 
accountable.164 The confusion is exacerbated by conceptualising act of state as a principle of non-
justiciability in detention cases, rather than a defence in tort, but nevertheless confining its 
adoption to the private law action. 
Second, act of state leaves no protection to extraterritorial applicants in the common law which is 
concerning because of the precariousness of the HRA, and particularly the extraterritorial 
application of the HRA in the UK. While at present the claimant is still entitled to protection under 
the HRA,165 the extraterritorial application of the HRA is contested. The government at the time 
of writing has expressed its intention to ensure vexatious claims against the armed forces for their 
actions abroad are prevented.166 In these circumstances, the common law will be resorted to in 
determining what civil claims can be brought. Act of state, whether conceptualised as a defence in 
tort or a principle of non-justiciability will leave the claimant with no action for extraterritorial 
alleged killings or detention under this Supreme Court ruling. Act of state will come to the fore as 
a decisive principle for defining the jurisdiction of the courts to review extraterritorial executive 
conduct in the absence of the extraterritorial application of the HRA. 
International judicial attention has been placed on the armed conflicts in both Iraq and 
Afghanistan by the International Criminal Court (ICC). The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II 
unanimously rejected the request of the Prosecutor to proceed with an investigation into alleged 
war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the context of the armed conflict in 
Afghanistan concerning allegations brought against the US.167 However, on 5th March 2020, the 
Appeals Chamber of the ICC decided unanimously to authorise the investigation.168 
In the Report on Preliminary Examination Activities, the Office of the Prosecutor calls to light 
allegations against the UK that from 20 March 2003 through 28 July 2009 UK servicemen 
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committed war crimes against persons in their custody in the context of armed conflicts in Iraq 
including wilful killing/murder.169 The Report assesses whether there is evidence to suggest the 
UK is unwilling and unable to investigate alleged crimes in conformity with the principle of 
complementarity. The office considered investigative journalism that brought to light alleged 
attempts to shield the conduct of British troops in Iraq and Afghanistan from criminal 
accountability.170 It further noted the intent by the UK government to create a statutory 
presumption against prosecution of personnel for alleged offences committed outside the UK 
more than 10 years previously, and which have been the subject of a previous investigation,171 
which would include investigations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Northern Ireland. The invocation of 
the act of state doctrine, and parallel expansive reading of UNSCRs, is in effect the court’s retreat 
from judicial scrutiny of these conflicts, except in cases of alleged inhumane treatment or torture. 
This could be construed as an additional indicator that UK institutions are unwilling and unable 
to detect, scrutinise, and hold relevant personnel responsible, for systemic rights violations in 
overseas conflicts, especially in vulnerable states hosting proxy wars between multinational non-
state actors. Act of state is a white flag in the battlefield of judicial warfare: the courts will not 
operate under the assumption that executive action against those harmed extraterritorially is 
justiciable. The HRA decision reinforces this element of surrender by the courts to executive 
decisions.  
Empire is alive and well, act of state is one vehicle through which it is manifested. But it is the 
colonial mindset, characterised by an ambivalence towards the extraterritorial, which is the legacy 
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